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DONALD R. GRIFFIN) THE QUESTION
OF ANIMAL AWARENESS; EVOLUTIONARY
tONTINUITY OF MENTAL EXPERIENCE
NEW YORK: THE ROCKEfEllER
UNIVERSITY PRESS») 135 PP.) 1976,
In this excellent review of research
concerning animal awareness, Donald
Griffin, professor of animal behavior
at The Rockefeller University, argues
that animals can think and experience
the same kind of mental processes and
sensations that humans experience. In
order to clarify the issue of consciousness
in animals he begins with a set of working
definitions: Thinking about objects and
events that are remote in time and space
from the immediate flux of sensations
constitutes "mental experiences." These
experiences include not only images,
but also feelings, desires, hopes, fears,
and a wide range of sensations such as
pain, hunger, rage, and affection. An
"intention" involves mental images of
future events in which the intender
pictures himself as a participant, and
"consciousness" refers to the presence
of ment~!~~~es and their use by
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animals to regulate their own behavior
(p. 5). The term 'awareness' is used
to signify an entire set of interrelated
mental images and experiences. He
suggests that we regard mental experi
ences, whatever their actual nature, as
closely linked to neurophysiological
processes within the brain.
Griffin covers a range of philosophical
and psychological theories that deny to
animals any significant mental experiences.
Our thinking about animals has been
dominated by behavioristic and linguistic
traditions in psychology. Given this
framework mental concepts such as
consciousness and awareness become use
less to the scientific investigation of
both humans and animals. He points out
that the denial of mental experiences to
animals has almost become an act of
faith, usually supported by arguments
connecting mental acts and thinking to
language and true language to humans
only. Animals are said to lack abstract
or conceptual thought. Hampshire, for
example, argues that it "would be sense
less to attribute to an animal a memory
that distinguished the order of events
in the past, and it would be senseless
to attribute to it an expectation of an
order of events in the future. It does
not have the concepts of order, or any
concepts at all." Linguists generally
regard animal communication as rigid
and mechanically predictable, whereas
human speech is not. Washoe and other
chimpanzees are denied true minds either
on the ground that they merely mimic the
sign language of the deaf or that they
have been taught this language by human
trainers.
Griffin contends that contrary to popular
opinion, the extension and refinement of
two-way communication between ethologists
and animals will lead to a science of
cognitive ethology. He cites several
studies of the communication and behavior
of bees, bats, and chimpanzees. Communi
cation signals have included at least an
announcement that the sender is of a
given species, sex, and appropriate age,
and is in one of a relatively few basic
behavioral states such as readiness for
fighting or fleeing. Chimpanzees have

learned to use large vocabulariesoi
gestures or manually manipulated symbols
to communicate complex messages. Griffin
points out that studies tend to show
that apes are capable of intentionally
conveying or withholding information
from their companions. Griffin's own
work with bats indicates that when flying
through thoroughly familiar surroundings,
many bats rely heavily on spatial memory
rather than ecolocation, a behavior
pattern that suggests conscious self
awareness.
The "dance speech" of honeybees turns out
to be much more complex and flexible
than generally assumed. There is no
escape from the conclusion, says Griffin,
that "in the special situation when swarming
bees are in serious need of a new loca
tion in which the colony can continue its
existence, the bees exchange information
tion about the location and suitability
of potential hive location. • • • Only
after many hours of such exchanges of
information, involving dozens of bees,
and only when the dances of virtually
all the scouts indicate the same hive
site, does the swarm as a whole fly off to
it. This consensus results from communi
cative interactions between individual
bees which alternately 'speak' and 'listen.'
But this impressive analogy to human
linguistic exchanges is not even men
tioned by most behavioral scientists"
(p. 23).

Griffin admits that complexity of commu
nication does not provide convincing evi
dence for the existence of mental experi
ences. However, combined with neuro
physiological similarities to humans it
does provide sufficient grounds for denying
the uniqueness and superiority of human
beings. It has, for example, been shown
that the minor hemisphere of the human
brain resembles an animal brain. The
subordinate hemisphere carries out many
mental functions considered to be conscious,
but lacks the ability to report them in
words. According to Griffin, such dis
coveries add to the evidence for physiologi
cal continuity between humans and animals
in brain function and suggest a continuity
in mental experiences: "To the extent
that basic properties of neurons, synapses,
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and neuroendocrine mechanisms are similar,
we might expect to find comparably
similar mental experiences" (p. 70).
Griffin points out that biological evolu
evolution is universally accepted by behavioral
scientists as a historical fact. Animals
are used in research as "models" for
medical and behavioral investigations on
the implicit assumption that principles
discovered in this way can be extrapolated
to our own species. This type of research
would not be productive if animals and
humans differ in kind: "If, for example,
human learning were believed to be radi
radically different in kind from that available
for analysis in other animals, no one would
even suggest applying to questions of human
education what has been learned by studying
rats, pigeons, or monkeys . • . • To argue
that language is unique to man and, there
therefore, no matter how complex animal commu
communication turns out to be, it cannot possibly
be continuous with human language, is
indefensibly circular" (p. 57).
Griffin correctly notes that, one must be
cautious in describing animal behavior in
terms of mental experiences. We do not
have evidence for the identity of animal
experience and human experience. The
use of mental terminology to describe
animal behavior does not imply identity
with human mental experience, but does
signify a degree of similarity to it.
He concludes that the degree of
similarity or difference is an appro
appropriate question for future investigation.
Griffin has given us a lively and con
controversial book which merits critical
attention by those interested in ethology.
Kathy Squadrito
Purdue University
Fort Wayne

